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I. INTRODUCTION

A. Background
The Americans with Disabilities Act (hereinafter, the "ADA") was enacted
"[t]o provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination
of discrimination against individuals with disabilities." 2 It is hailed as "the most
comprehensive piece of disability civil rights legislation ever enacted, and the
most important piece of civil rights legislation since the 1964 Civil Rights Act."3
The ADA is not the first piece of federal legislation enacted to protect persons
with disabilities. The Rehabilitation Act of 19734 protects "handicapped
individuals" from discrimination by entities which receive federal funding.
However, until the implementation of the ADA, entities which existed entirely
in the private sector were free to discriminate against persons with disabilities.
The ADA remedied this anomaly by prohibiting discrimination by employers
(private, as well as state and local), employment agencies, joint labor-manage-

1

Assistant Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall School of Law, Cleveland State
University; B.A. Bamard College, Columbia University, 1978;J.D., New York University
School of Law, 1981. Prior to joining the faculty of Cleveland-Marshall College of Law,
Prof. Martin served as the Special Assistant to EEOCCommissionerJoyce E.Tucker and
as an Assistant General Counsel for the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police
Department.
242 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (Supp. V 1993).
3
Arlene Mayerson, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct-An Historic Overview, 7 THE
LAB. LAw. 1, 1 (The Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund, Inc., 1991).

429 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1988 and Supp. 1991).
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ment committees, 5 and entities which provide goods and services to the public
6
including, but not limited to, transportation and telecommunications.
In the ADA's statement of "Findings and Purpose," Congress found that
43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities, and that
this number is increasing. 7 Historically, persons with disabilities have been
isolated, segregated, and otherwise discriminated against in the areas of
employment, housing, education, transportation, communication, recreation,
health services and access to public services, and even in the pursuit of
guaranteed constitutional rights such as the right to vote. 8 This discrimination
was often intentional 9 due to stereotypical assumptions about persons with
disabilities "based on characteristicsthat are beyond the control of such individuals
and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the
individual ability of such individuals to participate in, and contribute to,
society."lO Congress recognized that additional, unintentional barriers, in the
form of architecture, transportation, communication methods, and
"overprotective" rules and policies, also prohibit the full participation of
persons with disabilities in American society.11
Congress determined that persons with disabilities constitute a "discrete and
insular minority" in American society,12 but that "unlike individuals who have
experienced discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, national origin,
religion or age, individuals who have experienced discrimination on the basis
13
of disability have often had no legal recourse to redress such discrimination."
The cost of this discrimination, and its resulting "dependency and
nonproductivity," has resulted in billions of dollars of unnecessary expenses to
support persons with disabilities.14 Based on these findings, Congress invoked
the powers of the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment of the

542 U.S.C. § 12111(2).
6

Amendments to the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 225, and the Cable
Communication Policy Act of 1984,47 U.S.C. § 611, enacted as part of the ADA, require
providers of telecommunications services to adapt and/or modify certain facilities and
services to give greater access to persons with disabilities.
742 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1).
842 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2),(3).
942 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5).
1042 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (emphasis added). This language is important in
understanding the intent behind the exclusions of certain categories of persons from
ADA coverage.
1142 U.S.C. § 12101 (a)(5).
1242 U.S.C. § 12101 (a)(7). Cf.United States v. Caroline Products Co., 304 U.S. 144,153
n. 4 (1938) (introducing the conceptof discrete and insular minorities into American law
as well as recognizing the need to provide heightened protection for such groups).
1342 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(4).
1442 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(9).
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Constitution to enact the ADA as a means of eradicating day-to-day
discrimination faced by persons with disabilities.15
Each of the articles included in this symposium summarizes the ADA and
details the particular provisions of the Act which pertain to its thesis. Therefore,
I will only briefly outline the Act's major provisions and implications for the
purposes of this introductory discussion.
The ADA prohibits discrimination against individuals with disabilities in
employment (Title I), public services (Title II), and public accommodations and
services operated by private entities (Title III).16 The Act als . contains
"Miscellaneous Provisions" (Title V), one of which places Congress and
agencies of the legislative branch of the federal government within the purview
of the Act.17 Complementary legislation prohibits discrimination in the field of
telecommunications. 18
The ADA protects an individual who has a disability A disability is defined
as "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the
major life activities of such individual." 19 The Act also protects an individual
who has a record of an impairment, 20 or is "regarded as" having an impairment,
21
irrespective of whether the person has such an impairment.
All possible disabilities are not listed. Courts will have to define
"substantially limits" and "major life activity" on a case by case basis. The

1542 U.S.C. § 12101 (b)(4).
1642 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(6). Consistent with Title H of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000a-(e), private clubs are excluded from coverage.
17
See 42 U.S.C. § 12209. Until passage of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, neither Congress
nor agencies of the legislative branch were subject to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and were, therefore, free to discriminate on the basis of race, national origin,
gender, and religion.
18
See amendments to Communications Act and Cable Communication Policy Act
supra note 6.
1942 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). The EEOC defines a physical or mental impairment as:
(1) [a]ny physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement,
or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems:
neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including
speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary,
hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or (2) any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome,
emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (1993).
A major life activity is defined as: "functions such as caring for oneself, performing
manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working."
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i).
2042 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B).
2142 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C).
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Rehabilitation Act (as amended by the ADA) will serve as a model22 and
administrative regulations promulgated by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 23 will be helpful. However, all disabilities
and their effects on an individual's daily life cannot be predicted and
incorporated into legislation, regulations, or case law. A disability which
substantially limits one person's major life activity may not do so to another,
depending on the degree of the disability and particular aspects of the
individual's life.
It is of particular significance that Congress specifically exempted from
coverage certain conditions which may be diagnosed as disabilities by the
medical or psychological communities. The ADA exempts from coverage
persons who currently use illegal drugs, 24 whether or not this use is due to an
addiction. However, it does protect persons who have undergone or are
undergoing drug rehabilitation and are no longer using illegal drugs.25 In
addition, the Act specifically excludes conditions in the following three
categories from the definition of disability: (1) homosexuality, bisexuality,
transvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender
identity disorders not resulting from physical impairments, or other sexual
behavior disorders; (2) compulsive gambling, kleptomania, or pyromania; or
(3) psychoactive substance use disorders resulting from current illegal use of
drugs.26 The Act also specifically states that an employer may restrict or
27
prohibit smoking in the work place.
In determining which groups would be protected by the ADA, Congress
made judgments with respect to its stated purpose that the Act would prohibit
discrimination against persons with disabilities "based on characteristicsthat are
beyond the control of such individuals."28 Distinctions were made to confine
coverage to classifications of individuals whom society deems to have been
afflicted with a physical or medical condition, but to allow discrimination
based on an individual's behavior.Congress did not intend to protect voluntary
behavior which was criminal, dangerous, unprofessional, discourteous, or
otherwise inappropriate to, or undesirable in, the work place; nor did it intend
to prohibit employers from rejecting applicants or employees based on
22

S. Jud. Comm. Rep. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. at 44-45 (1989); H.R. Labor

Comm. Rep. No. 485,101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 51 (1990).
23

See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630-1630.16 (1993).

2442 U.S.C. § 12114(a); 42 U.S.C. § 11210(a). See also discussion comparing the ADA
with the Rehabilitation Act, below, with respect to ADA amendments to the
Rehabilitation Act which exclude both persons who currently use illegal drugs and
persons whose current use of alcohol interferes with job performance.
2542 U.S.C. § 12114(b); 42 U.S.C. § 12210(b).
2642 U.S.C. § 12211.
2742 U.S.C. § 12201(b).
2842 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7).
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individual personality traits or life-choices. Instead, the Act targeted those
persons with the most obvious and severe physical and mental disabilities
which were clearly not within the control of the affected individuals. This
legislation would have been exceedingly more complicated and controversial
if Congress had attempted to resolve questions of whether conditions such as
gambling, stealing, child molestation, drug abuse, or homosexuality are
voluntary life choices or physical or mental impairments amounting to
disabilities.
Nevertheless, courts will have to determine whether certain types of socially
unacceptable behavior are protected when this behavior is caused by a physical
or mental disability which is not specifically exempt from ADA coverage. Most
notably, how does one distinguish socially unacceptable behavior from a
mental disability? Some of these issues are discussed in the following articles,
particularly those focusing on "sanism" and problems in accommodating
persons with mental disabilities.
B. Title I: Employment
It is anticipated that Title I, regulating employment, will be the most litigated
provision of the ADA because of its widespread implications for employers,
the disability community, the general work force, consumers, and the economy.
It will change the way workers interact in the work place. In some instances, it
will alter job descriptions, duties, and even the way that employers conduct
their businesses. As workers with disabilities are seen performing duties which
they were previously presumed incapable of performing, attitudes will
necessarily change. Yet, in some cases, attitudes must first change in order to
accommodate some of these workers in particular positions.
There must be a realistic, reasonable, and fair balance of interests. The ADA
requires that a person with a disability be "qualified"29 for the position in
question. A person with a disability must be able to perform the "essential
functions" of the job, either with or without a reasonable accommodation in
order to be covered by the ADA. 30 These accommodations may include
providing additional equipment, changing or reducing work hours, allowing
for work-at-home or additional sick leave, reassigning duties to other
employees, restructuring the job and perhaps the jobs of co-workers, and, in
some instances, hiring additional employees to perform tasks (such as a reader
for a blind person or a "signing"interpreter for a deaf person) for persons with
31
disabilities.
The Saideman, Daly-Rooney, and Dorfman articles focus on Title I of the
ADA and offer insightful analyses of anticipated problems to be addressed by
courts under the Act. Each article raises important legal and social questions
which must be answered by the courts and the public. If the courts cannot
2942 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
30

1d.

3142 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B).
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effectively answer these questions, it may be necessary for Congress to
reconsider and amend the ADA.
C. Title II: Public Services
Another controversial and crucial area of implementation of the ADA is in
the area of public services. How will the court system deal with persons with
disabilities in the courtroom? How can we ensure that persons with
communication disabilities, diminished mental capacities, or mental
disabilities which result in inappropriate behavior, are adequately
accommodated in court, the prison system, and in their interactions with their
own representatives? Both the Gould and Simon articles address many of these
concerns.
II. THE ADA AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS Acr OF 1964
The purpose and findings of the ADA are clearly analogous to those which
served as the motivation for the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.32
Both the language and concepts in the ADA are modeled after the 1964 Act.33
Therefore, as indicated in its statement of Findings and Purpose, the ADA can
be viewed as the legislation which does for persons with disabilities what the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, did for
racial, ethnic and religious minorities, and women. 34
Despite the parallels in the Acts, there are differences. For example, Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in employment "because
of '35 or "on the basis of'36 race, color, sex, national origin or religion, while Title
I of the ADA prohibits discrimination againstpersons with disabilities 3 7 In the
Title VII context, it is not only the discrete and insular minority which is
protected against discrimination, but also members of the majority group.38
Preferential treatment of minorities is not permitted under Title VII unless

32

Both were enacted under authority of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Commerce Clause.
33

The ADA was also modeled after Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act which
prohibits discrimination against 'handicapped individuals" in programs receiving
public funds. Section 504 was also grounded in language and concepts of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act.
34
The statement of Findings and Purpose also indicates that persons are protected
from discrimination on the basis of age. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(4). This protection is
derived from the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1975, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(1982).

3542 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)-(d) (Supp. M111991).
3642 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).

3742 U.S.C. §§ 12101(b)(1), (2); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
38
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987); Firefighters Local 1784 v.
Stotts, 467U.S. 561 (1984);UnitedSteel WorkersofAmerica v. Weber, 443U.S. 193 (1979).
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specific criteria are met to justify affirmative action.39 In contrast, under the
ADA, an employer is free to extend preferential treatment to a job applicant
with a disability without the fear that an applicant without a disability will
bring a "reverse discrimination" lawsuit.
The ADA also differs from Title VII in that, except in some cases of religious
accommodation, 40 Title VII does not impose upon the employer an affirmative
duty to accommodate the employee by altering the job in question, expending
any additional money, or "rethinking" the position or the business in any way.
Title VII requires only that the employer include all protected persons in the
employment process and not treat them differently on the basis of race, color,
national origin, sex, or religion. Racial and ethnic minorities are not entitled to
any special treatment in the workplace, but are expected to perform the job
in the same way as a majority member would perform it.41 Conversely, the
ADA specifically requires the employer to provide a "reasonable
accommodation"42 to an individual with a disability which will allow that
person to effectively perform the job.
"Reasonable accommodation" can only be defined in a specific context.
Similarly, the related defense of "undue hardship" must be examined on a case
by case basis. An accommodation which constitutes an undue hardship for one
employer may be easily accomplished by another. The cost of the
accommodation must be assessed in relation to the budget of the particular
employer, the salary or economic worth of the employee to be accommodated,
and other economic factors. Personnel changes and reassignments are
considered in relation to the number, assignment, and duties of the particular
employees involved. The nature of the business may also be relevant to this
determination.

39

See cases cited supra, note 38.

40Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60 (1986); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977); United States v. Board of Educ., 911 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1990);
EEOC v. University of Detroit, 904 F.2d 331 (6th Cir. 1990).
41

Under an adverse impact analysis, a hiring criterion may be eliminated where it
disproportionately eliminates members of protected groups and cannot be justified by
business necessity. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); see also Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (modified Griggs,but was itself modified by
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k), with respect to burdens of proof).
See also Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1979) (physical criteria
modified to eliminate adverse impact on women). Although elimination of the
discriminatory criterion does not generally change the duties of the position, there are
some instances in which duties have been modified in the Title VII context to
accommodate women. For example, some courts have required prison officials to alter
the duties of female deputies and/or prison guards in male facilities in order to protect
the privacy rights of inmates. Hardin v. Stynchcomb, 691 F.2d 1364 (11th Cir. 1982);
Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 612 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1980); Harden v.
Dayton Human Rehabilitation Ctr., 520 F. Supp. 769 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
4242 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
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III. THE ADA AND THE REHABILITATION ACT

Although the concept of reasonable accommodation was not part of the
statutory language of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and only developed in limited
circumstances in Title VII case law pertaining to religion and sex, courts have
had a wealth of experience with the phenomenon of reasonably
accommodating persons with disabilities in the context of Sections 503 and 504
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.43 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which
covers public entities, was the model for the ADA. Section 503 of the Act
prohibits discrimination in employment by federal contractors. 44 Much of the
ADA's language is taken verbatim from the Rehabilitation Act, except that the
term "disability" is used in the ADA in place of "handicap" in the Rehabilitation
Act. The legislative history of the ADA directs courts to case law decided under
The Rehabilitation Act for interpretive guidance. 45 Case law under the
Rehabilitation Act has already provided us with variations on fact patterns
which can serve as a "blueprint" for determining what accommodations are
reasonable under various circumstances and what constitutes undue
hardship. 46
Nevertheless, some of the case law decided under the Rehabilitation Act will
be invalid under the ADA and, in fact, will no longer serve as precedent for
interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act. The ADA specifically amended the
Rehabilitation Act by excluding from coverage: (1) persons who currently use
illegal drugs; and (2) persons whose current use of alcohol interferes with their
performance of the essential functions of the job or poses a "direct threat" of
harm to others in the work place. Again, these exclusions reflect Congress'
stated purpose to protect persons whose disabilities are beyond their own
control.

4329 U.S.C. §§ 701-796.
44
Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act regulates public services provided by the
federal government.
45
H. Labor Report, supra note 22, at 77; S. Judiciary Report, supra note 22, at 44-45;
Stillwell v. Kansas City, Mo. Bd. of Police Comm'rs, No. 94-1003-CV-W-1, 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 88 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 5, 1995); Peoples v. Nix, No. 93-5892, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11321 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 12,1994); Medical Society v. Jacobs, No. 93-3670 (WGB), 1993 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 14294 (D. NJ. Oct. 5, 1993); Easley v. Snider, 841 F. Supp. 668,672 (E.D. Pa.
1993); Conner v. Branstad, 839 F. Supp. 1346,1357 (S.D. Iowa 1993).
46

See sources cited supra note 45. See also, e.g., School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273
(1987); Stutts v. Freeman, 694 F.2d 666 (11 th Cir. 1983); Stra thie v. Department of Transp.,
716 F.2d 227, 234 (3d Cir. 1983); Bentivegna v. United States Dep't of Labor, 694 F.2d 619
(9th Cir. 1982); Serrapica v. City of New York, 708 F. Supp. 64 (S.D.N.Y.), affd nem., 888
F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1989); Davis v. Meese, 692 F. Supp. 505 (ED. Pa. 1988), affd, 865 F.2d
592 (3rd Cir. 1989); Crane v. Dole, 617 F. Supp. 156 (D.D.C. 1985); Fitzgerald v. Green
Valley Area Educ. Agency, 589 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. Iowa 1984).
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IV. OVERVIEW OF ARTICLES INCLUDED IN THIS SYMPOSIUM

This collection of articles examines the ADA fromvarious perspectives. Each
gives its own summary of the Act and then focuses on an issue of major concern
with respect to implementation of the Act. The articles of Michael Perlin, Keri
Gould, and Deborah Dorfman were originally presented at the Disability
Rights Conference held at Hofstra University School of Law in October, 1992.
Professor Michael L. Perlin's article, The ADA and Persons with Mental
Disablities: Can Sanist Attitudes Be Undone? focuses on the need for public
education against "sanism," or prejudice against persons with mental
disabilities. Perlin's thesis applies to the entire Act and refers to specific
problems in both the employment and public accommodations contexts. The
author contends that the ADA cannot be fully implemented unless and until
the general population discards the unfounded fears, myths, and stereotypes
surrounding persons with mental disabilities. Much like the arguments made
with respect to racism and sexism, the author contends that attitudes cannot
be legislated, and that attitudes will largely determine how the ADA is
interpreted and applied. This is particularly important in the context of
defining "an individual with a disability" and in determining what type of
"reasonable accommodation" is appropriate in a specific case. When an adverse
employment decision is made based on admittedly inappropriate or
undesirable behavior, courts will have to determine whether the behavior was
knowing and voluntary, thus not covered by the ADA, or whether the behavior
is a symptom of a mental disability and therefore covered under the Act. Where
ADA coverage is established, a court will then have to determine whether such
behavior can be reasonably accommodated or will present an undue hardship.
A Strategy for Fighting Employment Discrimination Against People with
Disabilities,by Ellen M. Saideman, is a comprehensive examination of Title I of
the ADA. The article systematically discusses and defines the major provisions
of Title I of the ADA and instructs attorneys on aggressive litigation tactics
when representing members of the disability community in employment
discrimination cases. Saideman focuses on some of the most difficult questions
that courts will address in interpreting the ADA, including who is covered as
a "qualified" individual with a disability. This is particularly controversial in
positions which include physical and/or psychological qualifications as part
of the stated hiring criteria. The article notes that the ADA is rooted in Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
Consequently, when determining whether an individual with a disability is
1qualified" for a position within the meaning of the ADA, Saideman instructs
attorneys to refer to case law permitting discrimination on the basis of national
origin, sex, religion, and age under the analogous bona-fide occupational
qualification ("BFOQ") analysis. Although the BFOQ defense is construed
narrowly, it is applicable where the discriminatory qualification is "reasonably
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necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise .... "47
If a person with a disability poses a "direct threat" to the health and/or safety
of others, the employer may exclude that person from the work force. 48 As
discussed in the Saideman article, this is particularly relevant for persons
involved in public safety positions such as a police officer, firefighter, bus
driver, or airline pilot.
Where public safety is involved, the court may examine the issue in terms
of the individual's ability to perform the essential functions of the job and/or
whether placing that person in that position would pose a "direct threat" to the
public, co-workers, or the person with a disability.49 Safety issues arise not only
from questions of whether a person can be relied upon to perform an essential
function of a public safety position, but also whether a person who can
physically perform the job will create an additional threat, such as contagion.
In the Supreme Court's decision in School Board v. Arline,50 which examined
whether a school teacher with tuberculosis was "otherwise qualified" under
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, there was no question that the plaintiff
could perform all the tasks necessary to teach children. The Court remanded
the case for a determination as to whether she could do so without posing the
threat of contagion to her students. As in Arline, under the ADA, interests must
be balanced so that persons with disabilities are integrated as fully as possible
into the mainstream of American life without endangering other members of
society.
Saideman recommends that where the person with the disability cannot
perform the essential functions of the job description as written, the position
should be "modified" or "restructured" as a "reasonable accommodation." 51 For
example, Saideman argues that a person with a disability who applies for the
position of police officer, but cannot affect forceful arrests due to a disability,
should be accommodated by being placed in an office position within that
52
department.
Saideman provides a good foundation for examining questions regarding
the structure of police departments, fire departments, corrections agencies, and
other public safety positions. In addition, her position provokes questions
which are beyond the scope of her article. For example, a police department
4742 U.S.C. § 2000e-(e).
48
EEOC Regulations include the requirement that the person with a disability not
posea threat to him/herself while performing the essential functions of the job. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(r). Although this language is not included in the statute, its inclusion in the
Regulations is supported by the legislative history. It is yet to be seen whether the EEOC
interpretation will be accepted by the courts.
49

1d.

50480 U.S. 273.
51

Saideman, infra at 62-63.
52Id.
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would face numerous operational dilemmas. How would this policy affect a
law enforcement agency's, ability to rely on the transferability of sworn
personnel? 53 How many persons with disabilities should a police department
be required to permanently assign to desk jobs while paying them the wages
of uniformed, full duty officers? At what point does hiring persons who will
never be full duty police officers become an "undue hardship" (for the
department and/or the public)? Is the new position, in effect, a civilian
position, which should be paid at a civilian, rather than a uniformed
salary/wage? 54 If the department is required to substitute lower paying
civilian positions for uniformed positions to accommodate applicants with
disabilities, would the payment of lower wages arguably constitute
discrimination against persons with disabilities in the terms and conditions of
employment?
Designing Reasonable Accommodations Through Co-Worker Participation:
Therapeutic Jurisprudenceand the Confidentiality Provision of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, by Rose A. Daly-Rooney, focuses on the reasonable
accommodations aspect of Title I of the ADA. The author offers new, innovative
ways of incorporating co-workers into the process of accommodating persons
with disabilities in the work place using theories of "therapeutic
jurisprudence." Therapeutic jurisprudence is defined as "the study of the role
of law (rules, procedure and legal roles) as a therapeutic agent."55 This analysis
proposes sensitivity to the therapeutic and anti-therapeutic consequences of
the law. Daly-Rooney contends that involving co-workers in the decisions
necessary to effect the accommodation, which may involve assignments or
reassignments to those co-workers, increases their level of sensitivity to the
needs of the worker with a disability as well as their willingness to assist that
person. Operating in opposition to this concept is the ADA provision which
requires that an employer keep any information related to an applicant's
56
disability confidential.

53

A police department is a para-military organization which depends upon the
transferability of personnel. Mahoney v. Trabucco, 738 F.2d 35,37 (1st Cir. 1984). In an
emergency situation, any member may be called upon to perform the duties of another
(particularly when the other member may be killed or injured). The ability to affect

forceful arrests is a national standard for police officers and has been held to be a
reasonable and necessary requirement for the position. Simon v. St. Louis County, 497

F. Supp. 141 (E.D. Mo. 1980), rev'd in part, afld in part, 656 F.2d 316 (8th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 976 (1982), on remand,563 F. Supp. 76 (E.D. Mo. 1983), affd, 735 F.2d 1082

(8th Cir. 1984).
54

Most police departments also have civilian members who perform non-hazardous
duties and are not required to meet the physical requirements of full duty officers.
D'Amico v. Willis, 534 A.2d 1248, 1249 (Conn. App. 1987); Danko v. City of Harvey
Pension Bd., 608 N.E.2d 333,343 (111. App. 1992).
55Daly-Rooney infra at 90 n. 8.
5642 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(c).
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The article uses three hypothetical situations to develop creative
accommodations with the assistance of co-workers. The first involves an
applicant for dishwasher who has a mental disability which affects learning
and causes minor behavior problems. The second involves an applicant for a
sales clerk position who is in a wheelchair. The third is a deaf applicant for an
associate position in a law firm. The article uses these hypothetical situations
to illustrate how co-worker involvement might incorporate these employees
into each work place. It offers methods and analyses, utilizing exceptions to
the confidentiality provision, which permit co-worker involvement in the
process. This article continues the theme of education of the public in
conjunction with enforcement of the law as a means for equal participation of
persons with disabilities in American society.
Title I of the Americans with DisabilitiesAct and ReasonableAccommodation, by
Deborah Dorfman, is written in the voice of a patients' rights advocate. It
focuses on reasonable accommodation, particularly for those with mental
disabilities-again, cited as the less sympathetic group as compared to those
with physical disabilities, due to the fears associated with mental illness. The
author reiterates the need for educating the public and the courts on the needs
of the disability community.
Professor Keri A. Gould's article, And Equal Participationfor All ... The
Americans with DisabilitiesAct in the Courtroom, examines Title II of the ADA as
a mechanism for ensuring equal access to the court system for persons with
disabilities. In addition to discussing generally familiar accommodations such
as providing a sign-language interpreter for a hearing-impaired individual,
Gould includes more problematic questions, such as accommodations to be
made for persons with mental and/or physical disabilities which involve
conduct considered inappropriate, or even contemptuous, for an individual
whose conduct is not related to a disability. For example, a defendant with
Tourette's Syndrome might involuntarily shriek, use profanity, or make other
socially unacceptable sounds or gestures in the courtroom. A person with
diminished mental capacity, particularly under stress, might not understand
expected courtroom conduct or understand what is being communicated. A
person with a sleep disorder may need frequent recesses. Gould also discusses
"sanism," citing Professor Perlin's work.
The final article, The Use of Interpretersfor the Deaf and the Legal Community's
Obligationto Comply with the ADA, by Jo Anne Simon, also interprets 'Title IIof
the ADA. Simon focuses on the rights of "deaf persons" and the "hard of
hearing"5 7 to equal access to the courts and the justice system generally,
including the legal community. Simon traces the history of the treatment of deaf
persons, noting that, "[i]twas presumed that speech could not develop without
hearing, ergo those who could not hear also could not think."58 Quoting
57
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Aristotle, she observes that, "'those who become deaf from birth also become
altogether speechless. Voice is not lacking, but there is no speech."' 59 The article
distinguishes between the "culturally deaf," defined as persons who were deaf
prior to the age of learning language and who "sign" as their primary form of
communication, and the "culturally hearing," defined as those who use speech
and lipreading as their primary forms of communication. The article is rich
with information necessary to understand the needs of the deaf and hard of
hearing. In addition, it instructs the legal profession in ways to communicate
with and accommodate the deaf community and provides specific resources to
aid in this endeavor. This article further illustrates that attitudes must be
changed through educating the public if equal rights legislation is to be
effectively implemented.
V. CONCLUSION

Together, the articles in this symposium provide a comprehensive overview
of the ADA. They highlight the Act's most important provisions and discuss
the most predictable problems in terms of analyses and litigation. They offer
both traditional and innovative legal analyses, while providing historical,
statistical, physical, and psychological information which educates us to the
needs of various groups within the disability community. This education is not
only important because it elevates the disability community, but also because
to do so elevates "us" as a people.

5
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